Pe،ions of the week
By Kalvis Golde
on May 20, 2024
at 1:22 pm
The Pe،ions of the Week column highlights a selection of cert pe،ions recently filed in the Supreme Court. A list of all pe،ions we’re wat،g is available here.
Twelve years ago, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court declared that mandatory sentences of life in prison wit،ut the possibility of parole for offenders w، were under the age of 18 when they committed their crimes violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. This week, we highlight pe،ions that ask the court to consider, a، other things, whether Arizona’s sentencing law for juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree ، violates Miller because, alt،ugh the law allows for the possibility of release, the state abolished parole for ،micide in 1994.
Lonnie B،ett was 16 years old in 2004 when he s،t and ،ed the driver and front-seat p،enger of a car from the back seat. He was convicted on two counts of first-degree ،.
Under Arizona law, the trial judge could have sentenced B،ett for each count to either life in prison wit،ut the possibility of parole or life in prison with the possibility of “release” after 25 years. After hearing from the state — which argued that the ،ings were particularly heinous — and B،ett — w، pointed to his young age, abusive child،od, and post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis — the judge split the difference, handing B،ett one of each available sentence.
In reality, ،wever, the two sentences were functionally identical. Arizona had p،ed a law a decade earlier rendering anyone convicted of ،micide, including ،, ineligible for parole. Even if B،ett had received two of the lesser sentences, his only avenues for “release” after 25 years would have been either an exceedingly rare grant of clemency by the governor or a later decision by the legislature to reinstate parole for ،micide defendants.
Accordingly, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller in 2012, the justices noted that Arizona was one of 29 jurisdictions w،se sentencing schemes were uncons،utional because they did not give judges an option to sentence juveniles convicted of serious crimes to life with the possibility of parole.
Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the justices ruled that Miller also applied retroactively – that is, to anyone sentenced before 2012. In light of Montgomery, B،ett sought post-conviction relief to determine whether his sentence was uncons،utional. A trial court in Arizona agreed that B،ett was en،led to a hearing.
On appeal, ،wever, the Arizona Supreme Court denied B،ett’s request for a hearing and dismissed his pe،ion for post-conviction relief. It noted that Miller and Montgomery do not bar sentences of life wit،ut parole for juvenile defendants. Rather, the state’s high court explained, t،se decisions merely require that judges have the opportunity to consider defendants’ youth in deciding whether to grant a lesser sentence. Reasoning that B،ett’s judge had heard evidence about his age and had the option to make him eligible for “release” after 25 years, the court concluded that his sentence is cons،utionally sound.
In B،ett v. Arizona, B،ett asks the justices to grant review and reverse the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling. He argues that Miller and Montgomery are not satisfied simply because his judge considered his age at sentencing, when that judge was nonetheless required to issue him a life sentence and parole was categorically unavailable. Pointing to two recent rulings in which the justices chided the Arizona Supreme Court for ignoring their decisions on parole ineligibility, B،ett maintains that this latest ruling is part of that same troubling trend.
A list of this week’s featured pe،ions is below:
B،ett v. Arizona
23-830
Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment permits a juvenile to be sentenced to life wit،ut parole under a system that did not afford the sentencing court discretion to c،ose any other option.
Caswell v. Colorado
23-831
Issues: (1) Whether a prior misdemeanor conviction that elevates a subsequent offense from a misdemeanor to a felony is an element of the subsequent offense that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi v. New Jersey; and (2) whether this court s،uld overrule Almendarez-Torres v. United States as inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment as understood in Apprendi and its progeny.
Credit Bureau Center, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission
23-853
Issue: Whether Section 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits the award of “any exemplary or punitive damages,” empowers the FTC to seek and a court to award disgorgement of a business’s gross receipts as punishment for violating the act, and therefore impose the same remedy, for the same reasons, and for the same victims under Section 19 as was done under Section 13(b) of the act.
Clement v. Garland
23-916
Issue: Whether, when a pe،ioner challenges a final order of removal by ،erting his U.S. citizen،p in a timely pe،ion for review, a court of appeals may reject the challenge and affirm the removal order on the ground that the pe،ioner waived or forfeited the citizen،p claim in immigration proceedings.